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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine how teams working on radical innovation develop a novel type of Absorptive 
Capacity (AC) to make use of external knowledge. In the setting of the semiconductor 
industry, which has long been an industrial reference for the literature on innovation, we are 
able to compare AC in incremental innovation and AC in radical innovation. Our central 
contribution is a framework of how radical innovation teams leverage external knowledge 
using a specific type of AC. By contrast with absorptive capacity in incremental innovation, 
which can be considered as an “epistemic AC” (EAC), based on a stable set of design-rules to 
address pre-identified problems, this other type, which we label “conceptual AC” (CAC), is 
based on “refined visions”. We identified three facets of CAC: 1) “desorptive capacity” 
enables radical innovators to overcome fixation effects and break from the known to “out-of-
the-box”, 2) “hook building” enables radical innovators to overcome cognitive crisis and 
isolation and link the unknown to multiple cognitive references and 3) “milieu stimulation” 
helps to overcome the temptation to limit exploration to existing knowledge by supporting the 
creation of new knowledge in the milieu. This capacity makes use of prior knowledge in 
multiple, counterintuitive ways, and is able to strongly influence organizations, strategy and 
mental models so that classical AC determinants become dependant variables in the CAC 
model. Our most important contribution is the reinvigoration of the study of the link between 
knowledge and innovation by underlining the role of creative concepts via a productive use of 
external knowledge in radical innovation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Absorptive capacity is one of the most important constructs to emerge in organizational 
research in recent decades for gaining insight into the link between knowledge and 
innovation. In 1989, Cohen and Levinthal analysed the role of R&D in this context and 
distinguished “information generation” and the “ability to assimilate and exploit existing 
information” for innovation purposes (Cohen and Levinthal 1989). They proposed a model of 
this second, less recognized capacity. They define Absorptive Capacity (AC) as the 
organizational capability to organize value and assimilate external knowledge in order to 
increase firm innovativeness. They assume that AC is a dynamic capability that depends on 
prior related knowledge in the form and combines value recognition of the missing 
knowledge, its assimilation and application. 
Generally speaking, absorptive capacity literature focused on the capacity to make use of 
existing knowledge, placing emphasis on the capacity to assimilate and transform it and the 
necessity for a firm to accept external knowledge as a legitimate resource for innovation. 
Studies adopting the notion of AC link firm’s innovative capability to the use of external 
knowledge sources as sources of new ideas (Laursen and Salter 2004), finding partners in new 
technology ventures (Rothaermel and Thursby 2005) or the creation of new products (Katila 
and Ahuja 2002), where a given technology or piece of knowledge is not only exchanged but 
further, collectively, developed and leading to a knowledge base increase  (this constitutes a 
dynamic process of collective learning). Recent recompositions of the notion suggest to 
capture the dynamics of absorptive capacity by adding feedback loops to model the fact that 
“future absorptive capacity is determined by the current absorption of new knowledge in 
organizational routines and processes » (p. 783) (Todorova and Durisin 2007). 
However, only limited investigations have been done on absorptive capacity with respect 
to radical innovation (Lane, Koka and Pathak 2006) (p. 2005). In the case of radical 
innovation, one notion of the “absorptive capacity” model becomes critical, namely “value 
recognition”: how to recognize value when it is not linked to past products and competences? 
How can a company identify the knowledge it needs for radical innovation? Moreover how to 
identify the relevant knowledge producers for this missing knowledge?  The notion of “value 
recognition” is often advocated in recent studies. For instance Todorova and Durisin 
(Todorova and Durisin 2007) argued against Zahra and George to maintain the notion of 
value recognition as part of the Absorptive Capacity. The authors show that it is a true 
component of absorptive capacity, independent of the others (acquisition, assimilation,…) (p. 
777: “in sum, the ability to learn-that is to absorb external knowledge-depends to a great 
extent on the ability to value the new external knowledge”); but they don’t explain how this 
capacity can be enhanced for radical innovation. This question of radical innovation is all the 
more important for the notion of AC that, from a purely formal point of view, radical 
innovation provokes paradoxes in AC: on the one hand radical innovation would require more 
external knowledge and hence more absorptive capacity; but on the other hand radical 
innovation requires to break design rules and breaks in “prior related knowledge” that could 
impede breakthroughs, so that if one considers, as do Cohen and Levinthal, that AC is largely 
a function of the firm’s level of prior related knowledge, then radical innovation should 
decrease AC. Hence our research question: how can AC support RI? Or more precisely: 
what kind of AC can support RI?  
We begin by analyzing formally the relationship between radical innovation and AC: we 
underline how they are , a priori, contradictory and we analyse classical approaches, that tend 
to consider that AC support of radical innovation is in the proportion to the breadth of 
knowledge domains; we show that these approaches are actually weak compromises. This 
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analysis leads to clarify three specifications that an AC for radical innovation should meet: the 
ability to help to overcome fixation effect of knowledge, the ability to identify multiple 
research spaces through generative metaphors, the ability to help to create new knowledge to 
explore original frames of the innovation issue. We next detail our methodological approach 
to discover and analyze the new type of AC that can support radical innovation: since we 
want to identify a new phenomena that has not yet been described in the literature, we need 
specific research material and analytical methods. We then present the results of our analysis, 
describing three facets of a new type of absorptive capacity: desorptive capacity, hook 
building and milieu stimulation. We show some properties of this new type of AC, that we 
call conceptual absorptive capacity: that it explains successful Radical Innovation, it is 
complementary with the classical AC, which we label epistemic AC, it supports strong 
“feedback” ie CAC tends to reshape organizations, mental models and strategy.  
 
PART 1. WHAT KIND OF AC CAN BE COMPATIBLE WITH RADICAL 
INNOVATION? THEORY AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES.  
 
1.1. Why is AC a priori contradictory with radical innovation: the logic of rule breaking.  
According to Lane et al. (Lane, Koka and Pathak 2006), there have been very few studies 
on the relationship between AC and radical innovation. But as the authors report, the literature 
gives actually two hints for further investigations on the relationship between AC and radical 
innovation: a first classical assumption is based on the fact that radical innovation creates new 
knowledge and hence tends to enhance the breadth of AC by the innovating firm (Van Den 
Bosch, Volberda and De Boer 1999). This underlines the fact that the feedback loop from 
Innovation to AC is particularly critical in the case of radical innovation situations. However, 
focusing in on the analysis of the feedback loop, one can notice that Radical Innovation  can 
also destroy competences (Tushman and Anderson 1986). In this way Radical Innovation is 
likely to have a negative effect on prior knowledge and hence on AC. This raises a first issue: 
is there a relationship between AC and radical innovation and is it a positive one?  
Secondly, based on the hypothesis that Radical Innovation involves new combinations of 
existing technologies and know-how (Kogut and Zander 1992; Van Den Bosch, Volberda and 
De Boer 1999), it is assumed that “Radical Innovation is best supported by an AC based on a 
broad range of loosely related Knowledge domains” (Lane, Koka and Pathak 2006). The link 
between Radical Innovation and AC seems therefore to be mediated by a very specific feature 
of AC: the breadth of Prior Knowledge. What is the type of “broad range” needed? Is 
“breadth” the only specific determinant of AC for Radical Innovation or are there other 
features that have not been identified in the literature so far? This requires a refinement of the 
initial research question: what is the kind of AC needed to positively influence Radical 
Innovation?  
On these two issues, literature provides us with several elements. Coming back to the 
definitions of Radical Innovation and AC we are struck by the fact that they rather lead to 
tensions in the notions of Radical Innovation and AC. To begin with Radical Innovation, the 
terminology on “non-incremental” innovation is quite rich: radical (O'Connor 1998), 
breakthrough, discontinuous (Birkinshaw, Bessant and Delbridge 2007), really new (Garcia 
and Calantone 2002), major (O'Connor 2008), exploratory (Benner and Tushman 2003; 
Jansen, Van Den Bosch and Volberda 2006),… Following classical approaches (Abernathy 
and Clark 1985; Benner and Tushman 2003), innovations are classified along two 
dimensions: the proximity to the current technology trajectory and the distance to the current 
markets. In this framework, exploratory innovations are radical innovations, designed to meet 
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the needs of emerging customers and markets. They offer new designs and create new 
markets (Abernathy and Clark 1985). Of particular relevance for AC study, this type of 
innovation requires new knowledge or a departure from existing one (Levinthal and March 
1993; McGrath 2001; Benner and Tushman 2002), it requires “the organization to move into 
unchartered territory, where reliance on experience, current knowledge assets, and loyal 
customers is not an advantage” (O'Connor 2008). 
This last sentence sounds as a deep contradiction with AC as it is often determined by 
“prior related knowledge”. Analyzing this contradiction in more depth, by using the reference 
definition of Cohen and Levinthal (Cohen and Levinthal 1990): absorptive capacity is “a 
firm’s ability to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it and apply it to 
commercial ends”. They consider that this capability “is largely a function of the firm’s level 
of prior related knowledge”. In case of radical innovation, following O’Connor, “prior related 
knowledge” might not be “related” anymore. This is particularly critical for the first 
component of AC, namely value recognition (or “exploratory learning’ as mentioned in recent 
works (Lane, Koka and Pathak 2006)): value recognition is precisely the ability to recognize 
external knowledge to get some value. This formally implies that there is some “prior 
knowledge” on what makes value (for instance market knowledge, etc.) and some knowledge 
to recognize relevant knowledge to obtain that value (for instance: some knowledge on 
technological alternatives). As explained by Lane et al. (Lane, Koka and Pathak 2006) “the 
prior knowledge of the firm […] influences the assessment of the value of new external 
knowledge” (p.857). But in Radical Innovation, this “prior knowledge” on market and 
technologies might be obsolete. Radical Innovation situations would deeply undermine prior 
knowledge, and hence AC.  
Nevertheless prior related knowledge is only one of the determinants of AC, and shouldn’t 
be confused with AC itself (Lane, Koka and Pathak 2006). Recent works extended the list of 
AC determinants. For instance several works particularly insist on the role of combinative 
capabilities (Van Den Bosch, Volberda and De Boer 1999; Jansen, Van Den Bosch and 
Volberda 2005) i.e the capacity to synthesize and apply current and acquired knowledge 
(Kogut and Zander 1992). Combinative capability is assimilated to “integration” capacity 
(Grant 1996) or “configuration” capacity (Henderson and Clark 1990). This capability 
structures problem-solving within the firm and shapes the development of new competencies, 
it can even be “the control systems and the ‘culture’ or dominant values of the organization” 
(Henderson and Cockburn 1994) (p. 66) Is the combinative capability sensitive to Radical 
Innovation? The example of architectural innovation provided by Henderson and Clark 
(Henderson and Clark 1990) already shows the limits of combinative capability in case of 
certain types of Radical Innovation. More generally, combinative capability is detailed as a 
capacity to better exchange knowledge across boundaries, to provide memory for handling 
routine situations and to apply tacitly understood rules for appropriate action (Jansen, Van 
Den Bosch and Volberda 2005). As mentioned above, in case of Radical Innovation, memory, 
routines, rules for appropriate actions might not be relevant. Even more generally, several 
determinants of AC were integrated in a general framework in Lane et al. (Lane, Koka and 
Pathak 2006), which added firm member’s mental models, firm’s structures and processes and 
firm strategies to prior knowledge. All these determinants are actually design rules, ie a set of 
knowledge for actions (routines) that people use in companies to develop new product for an 
incremental innovation.  Firm’s members consider them as stable basics to structure (i.e to 
constrain as well as to enable) value recognition and knowledge acquisition and use. But 
Radical Innovation might require changes in firm strategy, firm member’s mental models and 
even firm’s structures and processes, i.e changes in the design rules, hence undermining AC 
(see figure below)  
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Figure 1: simplified model of AC (from (Lane, Koka and Pathak 2006))!
 
 
This short review of literature underlines 1) the sensitivity of AC determinants (Prior 
Knowledge, combinative capability, firm’s members mental models, firm strategies, firm 
processes) to Radical Innovation situations, 2) the undermining of value recognition (or 
exploratory learning) in radical innovation situation. It appears also that this is due to the fact 
that these determinants and this value recognition capacity are all based on a set of design 
rules that constrain as well as enable AC. The reference model of AC is “rule based”, or, to 
use a foucauldian term (Foucault 1966), an “epistemic” model of AC, ie a model of AC based 
on a relatively stable episteme (representation of things, of competitions, of competences, of 
markets,…). This leads to assume that in radical innovation situations that tend to break the 
stable set of design rules, on which the epistemic AC is based, firm’s epistemic AC might be 
severely undermined.  
 
1.2. The weak compromise between AC and radical innovation: the breadth of the 
knowledge domains.  
However, this leaves us with a strong paradox since in case of Radical Innovation, it is 
particularly relevant to be able to use external knowledge (Van Den Bosch, Volberda and De 
Boer 1999; Benner and Tushman 2003; Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler 2009b), all the more 
so that internal knowledge has become less valuable.  
Previous works have solved this paradox by emphasizing the importance of the breadth of 
related knowledge. In the seminal paper of Cohen and Levinthal, the authors explain that in 
“conditions of rapid and uncertain technical change”, it is best for the organization to expose a 
“fairly broad range of prospective ‘receptors’ to the environment” (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990), as suggested in “organic structures” (Burns and Stalker 1961). One issue in radical 
innovation is then to cover a “range of loosely related knowledge domain” that is broad 
enough (Lane, Koka and Pathak 2006). Done internally, such an exploration would be 
constrained by the scarcity of resources and could mean high risk and financial exposure. But 
the access to external knowledge eases the constraints (Katila and Ahuja 2002; Gupta, Smith 
and Shalley 2006) so that “potential negative effect of excessive internal exploration are 
likely limited in external knowledge exploration” (Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler 2009a). It 
is critical to understand why this “broad range of knowledge domain” is not contradictory 
with radical innovation, considered as competence destroying. In a cognitive approach, this 
combination of AC and radical innovation can be explained by the fact that radical innovation 
is never completely new, partly based on prior knowledge (Szulanski 1996; Todorova and 
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Durisin 2007; Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler 2009a), or resulting from the combination of 
prior existing knowledge and know-how (Kogut and Zander 1992; Van Den Bosch, Volberda 
and De Boer 1999; Lane, Koka and Pathak 2006). In this case Prior Knowledge would still be 
a relevant determinant of AC for the “Non radically innovative” knowledge.  
This view is valid as long as the innovation is not “too radical”, ie as long as the innovation 
issue does actually require quite a lot of prior knowledge. This fits well with the 
representation of innovation challenge as a problem solving, as it is claimed by Cohen and 
Levinthal in their seminal work: based on Simon works (Simon 1985), they assimilate 
problem solving to creativity (see p.130-131). Coming back to this framework, to innovate is 
to find a solution in a complex search space (or problem space), while the dimensions of the 
search space and the attributes of the “good” solution are known. For instance the design of 
an electric car would be considered as “finding the combination of motor, battery, 
suppliers,… that meet the requirements x, y, z…” where all the batteries, motors, etc… and 
all the requirements x, y, z are known (and possibly even the algorithm to find the solution). 
Hence prior related knowledge is defined as all the knowledge that enables to deduce the 
solution.  
Suppose now that one piece of knowledge is missing (component or architectural 
knowledge) in the knowledge base of which the organization is making use: this is a type of 
radical innovation. Either the organization has anticipated this mismatch with prior related 
knowledge, having extended its range of possible component or combination beyond its usual 
knowledge base, or this knowledge is really missing in the prior related knowledge to deal 
with this part of radical innovation. For a limited number of missing pieces, the broader the 
range of knowledge domains, the higher the probability to fill the gap. 
Suppose now that the innovation issue requires a lot of new knowledge and this new 
knowledge can not be anticipated easily. For instance if the design brief is: “an electric 
network for vehicles”: this “innovation issue” is not a “problem” in the strictest meaning 
given by Simon. What is an electric vehicle? What kind of network? For whom? For which 
customers, users and usages? For which business model? With which technologies? There is 
no components list, no given evaluation criteria, no “well-identified” problem space. In this 
type of innovation issue, there appears a potentially infinite number of missing pieces. Then 
the required “breadth” might be exceedingly large. Hence there appears a kind of “balance”, a 
compromise between innovation radicality and AC based on prior related knowledge. This 
leads us to conclude that the “breadth  of knowledge domain” explains only a weak (still 
positive) relationship between AC and radical innovation. In case of stronger radicality, this 
positive relationship might be severely undermined.  
One should underline two points regarding such ‘extreme’ radical innovation: such 
extreme “radicality” is not so rare since some companies are today seeking for “major 
innovation” (O'Connor and DeMartino 2006) to intentionally break design rules. They 
intentionally try to destroy competences to gain competitive advantage. They don’t try to 
innovate while limiting competence destruction; they radically innovate in order to change the 
knowledge base. Second, this kind of radical innovation is not exactly accounted for by the 
classical approach of “turbulent environment” since turbulent environment can mean “fast 
obsoletness of prior related knowledge” as well as “extreme reuse of prior related knowledge” 
(continuous innovation) (Eisenhardt 1989b; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; Lichtenthaler and 
Lichtenthaler 2009a). The extreme reuse of prior related knowledge would lead to a positive 
influence moderating effect of turbulent environment on the relationship between AC and 
innovation whereas the fast obsoletness aspect would have an undecidable or even negative 
moderating effect on the relationship between  AC and innovation. This would explain the 
unconclusive result regarding the moderating effect of turbulent environment on the 
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relationship between AC and innovation (Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler 2009a). Our 
question in this paper is not the moderating effect of turbulent environment on the relationship 
between AC and innovation; our question is the moderating effect of radical innovation 
situation on the relationship between AC and radical innovation. One typical question for this 
paper is: if a company seeks to radically innovate (radical innovation situation), is there a 
positive relationship between AC and its success in radical innovation? Should this company 
rely on AC? What kind of AC? Ie  what are the determinants of AC that explain this (negative 
or positive) relationship?  
Up until now we have argued that AC and radical innovation are not self-evidently 
positively related: of course the use of external knowledge might be relevant for radical 
innovation, but radical innovation tends to destroy competences and the design rules that 
underline (epistemic) AC components (value recognition) and determinants (Prior 
Knowledge, firm strategies, mental models,…) so that it is also AC destroying (epistemic). 
We have also shown that the classical hypothesis of the “breadth of knowledge domain” 
explains a weak correlation between AC and radical innovation. We see now a clear gap in 
the literature: in case of strongly radical innovation situation, what is the relationship between 
AC and radical innovation? what are the components of AC that could possibly induce a 
positive relationship between AC and radical innovation?  
 
1.3. Research questions: beyond epistemic AC, towards an extended model of AC 
To formulate some propositions regarding this relationship, we follow a cognitive 
approach, like Cohen and Levinthal’s seminal paper. Recent progress in cognitive sciences on 
design and creativity help us to characterize radical innovation issues, beyond problem 
solving.  
1- Radical innovation issues correspond to so-called “ill-defined” (Simon 1969; Simon, 
Newell and Shaw 1979; Schön 1990) or “wicked” problems (Rittel 1972; Rittel and Webber 
1972; Dunne and Martin 2006), ie a ‘problem’ without ‘problem space’, without set of 
constraints, without pre-given criteria for being ‘right or wrong’. Even the term of “problem” 
is misleading in such a situation, that’s why we rather speak of an “innovation issue”. In such 
a situation, Simon considers that designers have to first “form” the problem space (list of 
constraints and evaluation criteria) before beginning a “systematic search”. But as underlined 
by Schön in such an innovation issue, a great deal of the design structure is fixed by the 
problem space (p.127) (Schön 1990). Therefore the critical issue of innovation is mainly in 
the way to “form” the problem space and not only in the way to solve it. Simon described this 
process of “forming” as “imagery”, viewed as a natural process which provides “a plan to the 
problem solver at least in the sense of a list of the elements he is dealing with and a list of 
which of these are related” (p.166) (Simon, Newell and Shaw 1979). Alexander has already 
underlined the role of models in such framing processes, underlining also that designers 
would evolve, refine or deeply change the  “models” in the “innovation process”, hence 
defining several problem spaces in an “innovation issue” (Alexander 1964). Schön showed 
that these models were actually “generative metaphors”: “Generative metaphor produces a 
selective representation of an unfamiliar situation that sets values for the system's 
transformation. It frames the problem of the problematic situation and thereby sets directions 
in which solutions lie and provides a schema for exploring them” (p. 132-33) (Schön 1990). 
This part of the innovation process is often considered as the creative one (Amabile et al. 
1996; Sutton and Hargadon 1996). It is often described as the personal insight or vision of the 
designer (Dunne and Martin 2006) or the leader.  
In the classical understanding of AC, prior related knowledge, is actually “related” to the 
“problem space” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). In a radical innovation issue, there is an 
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intermediary step to relate the radical innovation issue to one or several problem spaces, but 
the contribution of AC to this step is not precisely analyzed in the literature. Interestingly 
enough, it is possibly based on “models”, or “generative metaphors”, hence on knowledge, but 
these models or metaphors are not deterministically related to the innovation issue itself. This 
leads us to a key  research question: how does AC support the “forming” of the problem 
spaces?  
Note that the classical determinants actually seem to play a role in this “forming” of the 
problem space: one would argue that the “models” or metaphors are actually determined by 
determinants examined above (combinative capability, firm strategy, firm members’ mental 
models, firm’s structures and processes and even prior related knowledge itself). But they are 
usually considered as contraints on the framing process and on the gathering and memorizing 
of prior related knowledge useful for solving the problem space. In this perspective, the 
question becomes: how could AC not be constrainted by them but rather could AC help to 
change and expand mental models, strategies and combinative capabilities?. We have to 
analyse how AC can help to overcome what is usually considered as constraints. This 
suggests that in radical innovation situation the AC model has to more deeply integrate the 
feed back loop from AC outputs (innovation, knowledge) to determinants (Van Den Bosch, 
Volberda and De Boer 1999). In radical innovation situation AC should act on its own 
determinants, so that the variables that appear as control variable in incremental situations 
become dependant variables in radical innovation situations.  
As a consequence, if AC plays a positive role in Radical Innovation, we should 
identify a component of AC that supports the “forming” of the problem space through 
“generative metaphors” or models.  
 
2- Not only is Radical Innovation destroying design rules and Prior Knowledge but it is 
also impeded by prior related knowledge. This is extremely well analyzed by Henderson and 
Clark (Henderson and Clark 1990) or exemplified by the notion of core rigidity (Leonard-
Barton 1992). Argote mentions that existing knowledge can be a disadvantage if managers 
generalize too much from past situations (Argote 1999). This effect is known in cognitive 
science and group psychology as a “fixation effect”: the individual (Finke 1990; Jansson and 
Smith 1991; Finke, Ward and Smith 1992; Smith, Ward and Schumacher 1993; Ward 1994; 
Ward, Smith and Finke 1999) as well as the group (Diehl and Stroebe 1987; Mullen, Johnson 
and Salas 1991; Paulus and Dzindolet 1993) (Brown et al. 1998; Paulus, Brown and Ortega 
1999; Paulus, Larey and Dzindolet 2000) tend to be stuck by existing knowledge and design 
rules into one (or a limited number of) problem space(s).  
This effect was often analyzed as “path dependency” in AC building (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990): existing Prior Knowledge leads to explore only some innovation areas and to neglect 
others. But in RI, a useful AC should be able to counteract the fixation effect, hence 
supporting a logic of “regime transition” (Geels 2004; Schot and Geels 2007). Hence if AC 
plays a positive role in radical innovation, we should identify a component of AC that 
helps to overcome the fixation effect of prior related knowledge.  
 
3- As radical innovation destroys prior related knowledge, radical innovation is impeded 
by prior related knowledge and, last but not least, radical innovation might lead to a clear lack 
of knowledge. It is already well-established that radical innovation requires knowledge 
creation, and not only knowledge transfer (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). This learning 
process can take the classical form of uncertainty reduction (validation), organized in the 
logic of experimentation (Simon 1969; Wheelwright and Clark 1992; Thomke 1998; Thomke 
and Fujimoto 2000), reducing technical as well as market uncertainty. In this case learning is 
 9 
seen as a test of hypothesis, with a clear link between action and the outcome. However Van 
de Ven et al. have underlined that in exploratory situation, learning cannot have this meaning 
since the link between action and outcome can appear chaotic (at least in certain phases of the 
journey) (Van de Ven et al. 1999): action creates unexpected knowledge and, after a while, all 
the unexpected knowledge can lead to a creative product. This process can be purely chaotic, 
the random creation of knowledge (on preferences, on technologies, on actions patterns,…) 
“increasing the likelihood of making creative connections between means and ends” (p. 88). 
This serendipity pattern is not the only one: Schön (Schön 1983; Schön 1990) describes how 
designers in wicked problems intentionally act and put themselves in knowledge creating 
situations to generate the emergence of unexpected solutions spaces. There is here an 
intention in the creation of an “expected surprising knowledge”, a piece of knowledge that is 
expected to be surprising, different from the classical expectations. The designer acts to be 
able “to come to see the situation, design trials, and criteria of fit in new ways”; he has a 
capacity to set himself in situations in which “running the maze changes the maze » (p. 128). 
Hence knowledge creation and learning do not only occur during the solving of the solution 
space but even during the framing of the solution space itself.  
One has already underlined how the classical approach of AC tackles this topic of missing 
knowledge: in the “weak compromise” between AC and Radical Innovation, AC contributes 
to increase the probability that the lack of knowledge is compensated by external knowledge. 
AC avoids knowledge creation in situations where the lack of knowledge was only subjective 
(knowledge was externally available). If there is a strong, positive relationship between AC 
and Radical Innovation, we should actually identify a component of AC that helps to create 
the knowledge that supports an original framing of the solution space. AC would still be a 
capacity to use external knowledge, but based on the capacity to order and organize the 
outside creation of new knowledge. 
 
One could therefore expect that some components of AC, rarely identified until now and 
different from the components of EAC (value recognition, assimilation, application), could 
have a positive effect on Radical Innovation. We raise three exploratory propositions for 
another type of AC that would be able to support radical innovation: the analysis of the main 
features of an radical innovation situation underlines that such an AC should 1) help to 
“frame” the problem space(s) through generative metaphors, 2) help to overcome the fixation 
effect and 3) help to stimulate the outside creation of new knowledge relevant to the newly 
framed problem space(s).  
 
PART 2. METHOD: EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY TO UNCOVER A NEW TYPE 
OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY 
 
In this article we investigate what type of AC is needed to be able to use external 
knowledge in Radical Innovation situation. Since this type of AC is until now not described, 
we need to conduct an exploratory research in a situation where we have radical innovation 
and the use of external knowledge. To conduct a fruitful exploration we need 1) a “reference” 
to be able to place as many variables as possible under control; 2) a “microscope” to be able 
to observe AC, i.e. to observe how people are able to make use of external knowledge and 
how it supports radical innovation.  
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2.1. Experimental configuration and sample structure: comparative case study 
We used an inductive, case-study research design (Eisenhardt 1989a), a methodology 
appropriate given the dearth of knowledge available in this field of research on radical 
innovation and AC. Case-study research is especially appropriate for research into new topics 
and new technologies (Siggelkow 2007), for studies focused on understanding the ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions concerning a contemporary set of events, and for studies intended to develop 
theory further (Eisenhardt 1989a). 
We have selected our case in the semiconductor industry (“next generation imagers” at one 
of the leading global  semiconductor manufacturers, STMicroelectronics, (ST)). We build a 
reference based on well known and well described phenomena of AC in the incremental 
innovation situation and we compare AC in radical innovation situation with this reference. In 
this way we ensure that the differences we find are strictly associated to the differences in the 
type of AC and the type of innovation. This sample structure gives much more robust results 
than a comparison of AC in radical innovation in a first context and AC and incremental in 
another context, where we would be unable to know whether the differences can be attributed 
to the innovation type or to the contexts. In a nutshell: we control for contextual variables but 
we don’t investigate their moderating effect. We study at STMicroelectronics two types of 
teams working both on the “next generation Image sensor”, working both by using external 
knowledge (AC), but one type of team works to get radical innovation, whereas the other type 
tries to design the next image sensor generation without radical innovation. We can infer from 
our sample and propose a new model linking AC and radical innovation.  
The kind of radical innovation is the independant variable and we study comparatively 
teams working to get either radical innovation on the issue of “next generations of imager 
sensor” or incremental on the same innovation topic. This strange configuration is due to the 
company context, ST, which purposefully dedicated two types of (complementary) teams to 
prepare for the “next generation image sensor”, one type of team being in charge of keeping 
the design rules while the other was precisely in charge of breaking the design rules. Since 
both types of teams are using external knowledge resources, we have here a suitable 
comparative case to analyze how the intention of radical innovation and incremental (yes or 
no, independent variable) led to specific type of AC (a dependant variable).  
 
Study population.  
STMicroelectronics met the radical innovation and AC criteria. In the semiconductor 
industry a number of radical innovation emerged in recent years following Moore’s law (i.e. 
the law that predicts that the number of components that can be incorporated per integrated 
circuit will double every two to three years, essentially by shrinking the basics pattern) and 
also, now, to explore “more than Moore” paths (see ITRS report 2009, (ITRS 2009)), i.e. new 
innovation directions that are not (only) related to shrinking the basic pattern. In the 
semiconductor industry, AC is also particularly relevant. Being strongly science-based, it 
relies heavily on knowledge production, and more precisely on external knowledge 
production, each industry player is linked to a network of knowledge producers. Interestingly 
enough Cohen and Levinthal noted that semiconductor industry was among the first to clearly 
state that they invest in R&D to strengthen their capacity to “assimilate new technology 
developed elsewhere” ((Tilton 1971), cited by Cohen and Levinthal 1989). Revisiting this 
seminal study was one of the main reasons to study R&D absorptive capacity in 
semiconductor industry.  
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2.2. Data collection 
We focus data collection on tracking the capacity to use external knowledge in innovation 
projects, over several years. We can’t neglect the difficulty of such data collection: we had to 
have access to the main designers, we had to discuss with them the use of highly technical 
knowledge and follow complex design reasoning. We had to access not only designers inside 
the company but also knowledge producers and providers outside. We also needed to 
triangulate with archival sources (including publications in the field –papers, patents-, 
conferences, external technical sources,…). We use three primary sources: archives, 
interviews and participant observation. One of us worked for 2 years as a researcher at 
STMicroelectronics with a mission to understand the innovation process and the capacity to 
use external knowledge. Moreover two of us were technically knowledgeable in the field they 
had to study. 
In -depth interviews were made with the main designers of the company working on the 
topic, each lasting from 30mn to 2 hours. The first interview guide had two main sections. 
The first section was composed of open-ended questions on the design process, the use of 
external knowledge and the overall picture of the projects of the case study. The second 
section focuses on the particular project the designer was or is working on. On this project the 
questions focused on the issue itself (why is it a challenge? What were the “unknown” things 
at the beginning? How was the design challenge formulated in the beginning: as a list of 
requirements? As a research question?), the state of the art at the beginning (type of available 
knowledge internally and externally), the evolutions of the projects (types of fitness functions 
and constraints, prototypes, capacity to produce knowledge, to use external knowledge and 
external knowledge production), the type of organization (missions, work division, resources, 
planning, meetings…; limits and advantages of the organization related to the issue,…), the 
relationship to strategy and strategic vision (were they in line with the vision, contradictory 
with the vision, generating and enabling new visions?). The experts were often met several 
times to complement and triangulate with the information coming from other sources. When 
the first interviews were made during the completion of the project, people were interviewed 
anew after the completion of the project to know how they evaluated their absorptive capacity 
and their innovation activity in the project.  
The experts were also observed in action since the researchers followed several steering 
committees of the projects. The use of multiple informants and the observation of meetings 
mitigated the potential bias of any individual respondent by allowing information to be 
confirmed by several sources (Golden 1992; Miller, Cardinal and Glick 1997). It also enables 
inducing richer and more elaborated models because different individuals typically focus on 
complementary aspects of the collective design process (Schwenk 1985; Dougherty 1990).  
Since we studied the use of external knowledge, we also gathered archival data 
(publications, patents, reports, public information in magazines…) and data coming from 
external informants. We had interviews with some external knowledge providers in various 
labs around the world and with competitors. This helped to mitigate the potential “company 
inside” bias by triangulating with data from outside. 
An historical perspective was gained through archival data (see above) and by interviewing 
the designers who worked on past projects, inside the company or outside. In this historical 
perspective we select a first set of interviewees mentioned by those actors (active at present) 
and extended the set by interviewing the main actors named by each interviewee. We stop 
extending the set when no new name emerged from the interviews. This rich material reduces 
the potential retrospective bias by triangulating data, matching real time archival data with the 
retrospective accounts. Allowing reconstruction of the histories of design processes in rich 
detail from various viewpoints.  
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 STmicroelectronics 
Domain Semiconductor, science based 
Use of external knowledge (AC) 
High: knowledge intensive, sector where the AC notion was born 
(Tilton 1971) 
Context Intentionally non RI Intentionally RI 
Archival sources Reports, Patents, PhDs, publications 
Number of internal interviewees 22 10 
Internal informants Project leaders, BU director, R&D director, Operations director 
Number of external interviewees 26 
External informants 
Competitors (US, Europe), Researchers in research labs (US, 
Europe,…) 
Table 1 : Image sensor case data 
 
 
2.3. Data reduction and coding 
 
Regarding the “observation instrument”: Lane et al. (Lane, Koka and Pathak 2006) have 
already underlined the limits of proxies of AC. In our case we pay a particular attention to this 
issue since we want to identify new dimensions of AC. We favor a detailed empirical analysis 
avoiding proxies. Moreover we need to follow complex collective, cognitive processes in 
innovative design situations, ie to analyse how people frame problem space(s), how they build 
and use generative metaphors, and how they target knowledge creation. We actually have to 
reconstruct collective design reasoning, based on data collected in each empirical situation 
and on high level analytical, design related tools. We needed to ground the investigation on an 
analytical framework that helps to identify new patterns. We rely on the most recent theory of 
design reasoning, the C-K theory (Hatchuel and Weil 2003; Kazakçi and Tsoukias 2005; 
Hatchuel and Weil 2007; Hatchuel and Weil 2009), to get a rigorous observation instrument 
to follow the cognitive process of innovation and knowledge production.  
The C-K theory describes a design reasoning as the interaction between two spaces, the 
concept space C and the knowledge space K. Design begins with an initial concept, a 
proposition that is neither true nor false ie is undecidable in the K space (called a disjunction). 
Such a design brief can not be said to be feasible or unfeasible, marketable or not,… Actually, 
the above mentioned “electric car system” was a concept. In our cases, “building with hemp” 
and “next generations of image sensors” were concepts. The design process consists in 
refining and expanding the concept by adding attributes coming from the knowledge space 
(the imager can be based on existing CMOS technologies or not, it can require the design of a 
new stack or not,…). The process can also lead to the production of new knowledge (eg: a 
new Si-based coating, a new etching process, a capacity to drill, stick, assemble and connect 
Si-wafers…) to be used in the design process. The initial concept set is actually step by step 
partitioned in several, more refined, subsets. The process unfolds until one refined concept is 
enough specified enough to be considered as true by the designer: the concept becomes a 
piece of knowledge (this is a conjunction). This often means that the concept becomes a 
manufacturable and marketable product. We checked that the conjunction correspond to 
commercial products. The generic structure of a design reasoning is presented in the figure 3 
below (source: (Hatchuel and Weil 2009)) 
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The C-K framework helps to encode the data coming from interviews to get a complete 
picture that accounts for the collective, cognitive processes. We tracked the expansion of 
knowledge space, expansion of the conceptual brief into several, varied alternatives,… When 
data was missing or some links between C and K were unclear we went back to the actors to 
get more information (complete with new data, confirm shortcuts in collective reasoning,…). 
In this sense this very general and abstract framework helped to control data consistency. This 
detailed picture helps to identify the pieces of knowledge used in the organization (including 
strategy, organizations and mental models) to develop incrementally new products. These are 
the design rules, ie the routines of action for incremental innovation. We can then identify 
whether designers in radical innovation situations make use of existing design rules (Baldwin 
and Clark 2000; Baldwin and Clark 2006) or create new ones, how designers are able to 
define missing knowledge characteristics (from C to new K) and how it leads to produce new 
knowledge (from K to new K). 
In parallel to this cognitive perspective, we also analyse relational phenomena by 
identifying relevant actors, the types of relations between them, the structures of organizations 
and their activities. In particular we follow the role of “research actors” and the knowledge 
providers (internal or external sources of knowledge). We were able to link all the knowledge 
pieces of the C-K graphs to the actors that propose and use it, hence identifying when external 
knowledge was provided, who did provide it, and who requested/used it.  
Such an analytical framework has already been successfully used in several cases 
(Elmquist and Segrestin 2007; Elmquist and Le Masson 2009; Gillier et al. 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The generic pattern of a design reasoning in the C-K design theory (Hatchuel 
and Weil 2009)!
This method first help to rigorously confirm that we are in the typical situations we wanted 
to have: 1) we can check that the project team is using knowledge from outside. We objectify 
absorptive capacity, avoiding misleading proxies. 2) we check radicality of innovation by 
checking that the team in the radical innovation project breaks a design rule that is used in the 
incremental innovation project. The design rule appears first in K space with the incremental 
innovation team and appears broken in C with the radical innovation team. 3) We check with 
experts in the field the facts that the conjunctions (results of the design process) correspond to 
“real” innovations (i.e. translate into products or prototypes).  
The method also helps to study the processes that designers follow in order to innovate 
radically while using external knowledge. This method helps to structure data coming from 
design activities and to identify patterns in the different situations (Miles and Huberman 
1994). We developed an understanding of the types of AC in each case study, which we 
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reconciled by going back several times to the data and back to the informants. Then we 
conducted cross-case analysis in which the insights that emerged from each case were 
compared with those from the other comparative case to identify consistent patterns and 
themes (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). We followed an iterative process of cycling among 
theory, data, and literature to refine our findings, relate them to existing theories, and clarify 
our contributions. This resulted in a theoretical model of a type of AC, called Conceptual AC 
(CAC), that is different from classical AC, which we relabel epistemic AC (EAC), and which 
is oriented towards radical innovation. 
We identify three aspects of CAC: disruptive capacity, framing capacity and the capacity 
to open critical paths through knowledge production. Categories were developed deductively 
(based on existing theories and concepts on radical innovation and underlying cognitive 
capacities for radical innovation) and inductively (derived from the collected data). The 
deductive section was constructed before the interviews took place (see above literature 
review and the questionnaire). The inductive component of the coding system reflects the 
exploratory nature of the study. Because we were researching a new topic area, we expected 
to discover patterns and factors not yet discussed in the literature. 
 
PART 3. RESULTS: UNCOVERING A NEW FORM OF AC IN RADICAL 
INNOVATION SITUATIONS 
 
In presenting the findings we first provide brief descriptions of the cases. We follow this 
by analyzing each case, utilizing the major research questions of our study.  
 
3.1. Image sensors at STMicroelectronics 
 
STmicroelectronics is one of the leading companies in semiconductors. One of its major 
businesses is the design and manufacturing of image sensors, one of the main building blocks 
in a digital imaging system such as digital still or video camera. The market for image sensors 
has been experiencing explosive growth in recent years due to the increasing demands of 
mobile imaging, digital still and video cameras, internet-based video conferencing, 
surveillance and biometrics. With over three hundred million parts shipped in 2007 and an 
annual growth rate over 25%, image sensors have become a significant silicon technology 
driver. The image sensor became a central business for STMicroelectronics almost ten years 
ago when it became possible to build low-cost image sensors on the basis of the classical 
technologies used for microprocessors (CMOS technologies), thus creating a market of 
cameras for the mobile phone. Just as the microprocessor industry follows the Moore’s law, 
every two years for the last ten years the CMOS image sensor industry has developed a new 
generation of products that improves the sensor resolution by reducing the size of each 
individual pixel that composes an image sensor. But each surface reduction tends to decrease 
the performance of the single pixel, since each one receives less light. Therefore one of the 
main challenges consists in shrinking the pixel size without decreasing the pixel 
performances. 
To meet the challenges of designing the next generations, several innovation projects are 
launched ranging from classical improvement to more discontinuous projects. At ST two 
types of projects are clearly distinguished. D-projects (development projects) are optimizing 
existing architectures to get the required performance for the very next generation. Advanced 
R&D (ARD) projects are in charge of exploring the ways to get radical enhancement of the 
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imager through breakthroughs in architectures and processes. On imagers, the two types of 
projects are very different in size: D-team gather 15 to 20 people (full time job) per year vs. 1 
to 3 people (full time job) per year on ARD projects. We followed the D and ARD projects on 
the development of the next image sensor generations during the period from end 2005 to 
2008. D projects are: the so-called 175-generation (launched in 2007), the four “grades” 
projects in this generation (i.e. projects to improve the 175 generation), three “experts” 
projects in charge of developing expertise for the generation and the development project for 
the following generation (so-called 140-generation). There was one ARD team in charge of 
exploring alternate concepts for the following generations, working from 2005 to 2009.  
D-teams perform very well since ST was able to stay on the roadmap and propose the right 
generations of product in the period. ARD teams perform also well since ST was among the 
first to present breakthrough prototypes of rule-breaking technologies (second in backside
1
 
prototypes, first in 3D prototype).  
In such a science based industry, all teams exhibit some absorptive capacity, i.e a capacity 
to make efficient use of external knowledge. In semiconductor industry the external milieu 
provides a lot of knowledge through publications, conferences, etc. Hence 
STMicroelectronics teams are supposed to make use of the knowledge provided by external 
research labs, suppliers, customers, competitors, etc. We compared how D-teams and ARD 
teams make use of external knowledge.  
 
3.2. Observations 
 
During our study, we identified situations where people are using external knowledge to 
develop radical innovations; they have broken rules that they consequently couldn’t use as 
prior related knowledge. Hence our data suggest that people in charge of developing radical 
innovation while making use of external knowledge develop a specific form of absorptive 
capacity. In situation of radical innovation, they break so deeply the design rules that they 
lose (sometimes intentionally) several of the cognitive references that enabled them to use 
external knowledge. They can’t rely immediately on the same research labs and partners they 
rely on in non-radical innovation situations. They lose their “epistemic absorptive capacity”. 
But they nevertheless use external knowledge for radical innovation, as in AC. In radical 
innovation, AC takes a novel form: people completely reshape the interface between the 
innovative project and external knowledge providers to establish an efficient link between 
these external knowledge providers and radical innovation. This capacity has three facets: 1) 
they first “destruct” the existing relationship between development (rule-based) projects and 
existing external knowledge. They free themselves from the fixation effect caused by prior 
related knowledge by breaking the design rules that are most contributing to fixation effect; 2) 
second, in situations where design rules are (now) broken, they are able to link the radical 
innovation proposition to existing external knowledge bases (not –or not only- the ones 
present at the beginning of the project), through generative models that work as “hooks” for 
organizing the link between the innovative project and existing external knowledge; 3) third, 
they are able to produce some pieces of new knowledge that open original, critical problem 
spaces and stimulate knowledge production in the external milieu. In so doing they create a 
renewed external milieu that support original innovation pathes around the initial innovation 
issue.  
                                                
1
 In the “classical architecture” CMOS image sensor, light travels to the photo-diode by traversing the interconnect layers that are build 
on top of the silicon substrate during the process. In the “backside” image sensor, the light is entering the sensor from the opposite side, 
and traverses the substrate to reach the photo-diode region.  
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To give a representation of this process one can use the metaphor of “absorption” or more 
precisely of “adsorption” (adsorption is the absorption of molecules from a fluid (gas, liquid) 
onto a solid substrate): if one considers the innovative project looking for some pieces of 
knowledge as a solid substrate and the external milieu providing knowledge as a chemical 
solution containing molecules in which the substrate is  plunged, the “absorptive capacity” 
describes the capacity of this substrate to adsorb relevant molecules onto it. In the EAC mode, 
the adsorbing sites are prepared to adsorb the relevant molecules and these relevant molecules 
are already in the solution: there is a pre-adaptation (and the notion of “episteme” precisely 
refer to this preparation of the substrate and the milieu). In CAC mode, the substrate and the 
milieu are not pre-adapted. The substrate must first be “cleaned” from unrelevant molecules 
that have been adsorbed in the past and block the access: this is the rule-breaking phase, 
where the substrate “desorbs” unrelevant pieces of knowledge to be receptive to new 
molecules. This is a “desorptive” capacity. Second the (now) free sites on the substrate have 
to be prepared and reshaped to be receptive to existing molecules in the milieu. This is the 
“hook building” capacity. Third the milieu itself might not contained all the relevant 
molecules and the substrate has to be reactive enough to support the development of new 
molecules in the milieu and associated active sites. This is the “milieu stimulation” capacity. 
A simplified version of the C-K diagram of the R&D teams working on the evolution of 
the imager sensor from one generation to the next one is shown in figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 : Simplified C-K diagram of “next generation image sensor” 
We develop each facet (desorptive capacity, hook building capacity and milieu stimulation 
capacity) in detail next. For each we study the classical aspects of absorptive capacity: 1) the 
role of prior related knowledge, considered as one major determinant of AC in EAC models 
2) the role of strategic vision, organization and mental models, which are considered as 
moderators (control variables) in EAC models 3) the effect of each facet on the use of 
external knowledge for radical innovation. For each we compare the case of interest with the 
reference to ensure that the facet is a characteristic feature of a new type of AC, different from 
the classical EAC. We evaluate the effect of the facet on AC and the radical innovation 
output.  
 
 17 
3.2.1. Desorptive capacity 
In radical innovation situation, ARD teams designers at ST face an ambiguous situation 
where there is a lot of knowledge available to work on their project (scientific, technological, 
business knowledge,…) but they feel that using directly this knowledge is very likely to 
impede radical innovation. Our data suggest that designers in such situations actually organize 
to break design rules to avoid the immediate reuse of existing knowledge. This is a clear 
difference with classical AC in incremental situation. The C-K representation of these 
different design trajectories is given in figures 4 and 5. 
 
Figure 4 : D team design trajectory 
People in charge of designing the next generation of image sensor in a incremental mode 
(D-teams) make immediately hypotheses on the knowledge they will use: they keep CMOS 
technologies, which is the mainstream technology used for transistors, following the Moore’s 
law; they try to adapt and optimize the CMOS technology to an image sensor while keeping 
changes to CMOS as low as possible. The projects in D-teams have a clear, predictable, 
feasible target for performance improvement. They are compulsory based on CMOS 
architectures and technologies. They use competences derived from past generations of 
imagers (based on electronic on CMOS and optic on CMOS). The projects show a strong AC: 
they use externally produced knowledge on CMOS, either knowledge coming from CMOS 
manufacturing, CMOS suppliers, CMOS research labs; they also use externally produced 
knowledge on optic on CMOS (also suppliers and research labs). 
Our observation on D-teams fit with the classical pattern of absorptive capacity: the 
interviewees explain they use CMOS-related knowledge because they know (prior related 
knowledge) that this knowledge base is very likely to help them get the image sensor 
performance. They also know how to use CMOS-related knowledge in the specific context of 
Iimage sensors. Moreover they know the next generations of CMOS, which follow Moore’s 
law. Hence they know how to make use of them on image sensors. Prior related knowledge 
appears as one major determinant of AC in D-teams. The “internal” determinants of AC are 
also confirmed: the interviewees and the heads of image sensors division consider that the 
imager business profitability approximately since its creation is linked to the capacity to use 
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CMOS-based knowledge (and related manufacturing capacities). Hence the use of CMOS 
knowledge actually relies on a widely shared mental model. There is no strategic debate on 
the use of CMOS: the investments are high but considered as justified (unavoidable) in the 
imager business. The competition is said to follow the same strategic path, as it is known 
through conferences, through customer roadmaps (mobile phone makers), patents, research 
programs and PhD dissertations.  
Hence CMOS reference appears as a design rule shared widely in the company, accepted 
as a mental model, coherent with the firm strategy and positioning in the competition. This 
design rule brings clear advantages for using external knowledge: ST designers are 
immediately linked to the CMOS community of researchers; this community is very 
powerful, following the Moore’s law, hence revising relentlessly its technologies, and 
coordinating efforts from varied sources (research labs, universities, competitors, 
suppliers,…).  
 
 
Figure 5 : ARD team design first steps 
 
By contrast the work of the ARD team led them quite fast to define their research project 
as the design of an ideal image sensor pixel explicitly “not necessarily based on CMOS”. We 
understand now that it is a strong rule-breaking. By doing this, the ARD team was 
immediately cut from the “mainstream” community in image sensor business as well as in 
CMOS. This hence appears as a severe reduction of the capacity to absorb knowledge from 
external sources. But this is not caused by limited prior related knowledge, as would suggest 
the classical positive correlation between prior related knowledge and AC: in our case there 
was some prior related knowledge that has actually led to break the design rules. Interviewees 
and reports show that in the past the exploration of “crazy” concepts had already shown the 
constraints of CMOS process for image sensor architectures: for instance a CMOS process 
obliges to separate “hot” (above 800°C) and “cold” (below 400°C) process steps and to have 
an image sensor architecture where “hot” process steps are done before the “cold” one. But an 
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“ideal” image sensor pixel could require architectures where “hot” process steps would be 
done after “cold” process steps. Recent image sensor generations have also underlined the 
necessity to slightly drift from CMOS. And finally simple models have shown a deep 
contradiction between CMOS trend (shrink) and image sensor performance since the shrink in 
the whole pixel tends to automatically decrease the surface that is available to catch optical 
waves.  
The proposition “not necessarily with CMOS” clearly cut from some external knowledge 
sources. One of its immediate advantages is to make designers more sensitive to other trials 
on image sensor “far from CMOS” and to new models of performance. They become aware 
of other deviants. For instance, at the beginning of the project, the designers were able to 
recognize very fast the value of a proposal made by Sony on a “backside” image sensor, i.e. 
an image sensor where light enters “through” the wafer substrate (on the backside) and not 
from above, as is the case in the classical architecture for CMOS image sensor.  
The capacity to break the design rules was actually based on one classical “determinant” of 
AC, namely organization: the ARD team was officially in charge of intentionally 
breakthrough innovation, or, in AC-oriented terminology, in charge of rule-breaking. Note 
that this organization was efficient also because ARD team was clearly aware of the trials of 
D-teams, they know that D-teams would ensure ST business in the next generation and were 
hence relieved from the constraints of an immediate application; and knew the difficulties of 
the use of CMOS-related knowledge in D-teams.  
Regarding the other “internal determinants” of AC, namely strategy and mental models, 
our data suggest a shift of status in the model, from determinant to depending variable. “Rule 
breaking” led to underline similar moves in the competition (toward CMOS-distant image 
sensor), to reveal weak signals in the knowledge space (surprising research program at two 
universities) and product space (surprising prototypes), to show potential benefits of CMOS-
distant pixel architectures (perfect optical path –almost no material obstacles between the 
photodiode and the lighting wave- and  perfect optical surface –almost the whole surface 
would be used for photodetection). Hence ARD teams were actually able to change strategic 
representations of the competition and the set of alternatives. Moreover they contributed to 
rework mental models: after some years of work, some managers, at top levels, have begun to 
underline the importance of exploring alternatives to CMOS at least as a good way of 
managing risk. As a consequence ARD teams were able to resist fixation effects and to 
withstand the resistance of the other R&D teams of the company involved in the imager 
business.  
The table below summarizes our comparison of the two types of teams regarding their 
positioning vs. Prior related knowledge and AC classical determinants, which we term 
“desorptive capacity” in the intentionally rule-breaking team. 
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Table 2 : desorptive capacity in the comparative case study 
 
This comparison helps to characterize a first feature of AC in situation of radical 
innovation: a “rule-breaking” capacity (see table 3 below) .  
1- Whereas EAC tends to follow the DNA of past products or process investment, CAC 
consists in “unlearning”, breaking from particularly constraining design rules, in the 
hope to discover promising alternatives. Interestingly enough, this does not consists 
in a pure “broadening of the range of knowledge” but begins with breaking one 
particularly limiting design rules or by formulating a very promising rule breaking.  
2- Whereas EAC choice of keeping design rules is based on the prior related knowledge 
that “it is very likely to meet the project target inside the design rules”, CAC choice 
of rule breaking is based on the knowledge of the negative consequences of applying 
the design rules. This knowledge might have been gained in past experiences or 
might be the result of a specific, dedicated study (as in the hemp case) which reveals 
the limitations caused by some design rules. Hence rule-breaking in CAC is also 
based on prior related knowledge, but prior related knowledge is not used to accept 
design rules as a constraint on the innovation issue, but to decide which design rule 
should be broken.  
3- Whereas in EAC, design rules will fit with organization, mental models and strategy, 
in CAC rule-breaking is an “organized deviance” (based on true organizational 
support, on a clear mission statement to change the game) that aims at evolving 
strategic vision and mental models. This organized deviance uses very limited 
resources and is justified in the organization, strategy and mental models as “risk 
management”: this is not considered as the main path but as a complementary path to 
make the overall design strategy more complete and robust. “Rule-breaking” doesn’t 
exclude classical EAC but comes to complete it.  
4- The consequence of CAC is a clear cut from design rules related knowledge base and 
hence a clear (initial) reduction of the capacity to use external knowledge coming 
from this source. This does neither bring immediate access to other knowledge 
Desorptive 
capacity 
ST Development (reference) – intentionally rule-
based 
ST Advanced R&D – intentionally rule-breaking 
Example Keep CMOS for the next generation: optimize, avoid 
changes. Keep also image sensor specific “optic on 
CMOS”. 
NOT “based on CMOS”. More precisely: design ideal Pixel  
Break the DR that is the “first order” condition on process and 
costs 
Prior related 
knowledge 
All CMOS related steps and improvement 
possibilities are well identified; expected performance 
on image sensor and system integration also 
identified.  Designers know that CMOS  basis ise 
likely to get pixel  performance. 
Some experts know how constraining CMOS can be (ex: “hot 
processes before cold”); they also know hat recent generations 
required small divergences from CMOS. 
Simple models show the deep contradiction between Moore 
shrinkage and image sensor performance (smaller = less optical 
surface) 
Strategy, 
mental models 
and 
organization 
Organization: several project teams working on 
independent and complementary D-projects.  
Strategy: no strategic debates; high but justified 
investments. This choice is coherent with competition 
(as known through conferences, Nokia roadmap, 
patents, PhD…) 
Mental models: use of the mainstream, general 
mental model since business creation (use CMOS 
resources) 
Organization: clear separation from rule based development, with 
a clear mission of rule-breaking.  
Strategy:  make rule breaking acceptable by underlining that the 
opening of new alternatives is a good way to manage risks. Also 
try to change strategic and competition representations 
Mental models: . Begin to rework mental models (“we should try 
this way, even if nothing today, it might become more sensitive in 
the future”) 
Effect on AC Use CMOS community as an external source of 
knowledge (CMOS community = the community that 
follows Moore Law, guided by ITRS roadmaps, with 
clear signals to organize the network linking research 
labs, suppliers, competitors, customers…) 
1- Disconnected from CMOS community (and CMOS-based 
imager community), Not easily connected to a new one.  
2- Capacity to interprete weak signals:  sensitive to other trials on 
image sensor far from CMOS, sensitive to new models of 
performance; find occasionnaly other deviants 
Effect for 
innovation 
Capacity to follow the expected performance of the  
next generation (be on time, increase regularly the 
performance level,…) 
Resist fixation effect: open new innovation pathes for alternative 
“image sensors”, with an “ideal” performance (perfect optical 
path, perfect optical surface) 
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sources: it only make designers more sensitive to signals coming from “out of the 
box”. It strongly support the capacity to fight against “fixation effect”.  
 
Table 3 : desorptive capacity - synthesis 
 
3.2.2. Hook building through generative models 
Once basic design rules are broken, classical accesses to external knowledge are not 
available anymore while links to new knowledge bases are not built. For instance breaking the 
rule “based on CMOS” free from CMOS constraints and cut from CMOS knowledge base but 
doesn’t clarify the competences that should be activated. Our data suggest that designers work 
to counterbalance these consequences of the desorptive capacity by linking their innovative 
(rule-breaking) project to external knowledge bases. They build “hooks” to attract external 
knowledge to their innovative projects. Each hook appear as one specific “problem space”, 
with more clearly identified “fitness function”, “constraints” and search process. Each single 
problem space paves the way to the use of a new “epistemic AC”. But to keep the advantage 
of being free from the fixation effect induced by design rules, designers generate not only one 
problem space but several problem spaces derived from the rule-breaking project. Hook 
building is hence a capacity to use existing external knowledge in rule-breaking innovation 
situations.  
In ARD teams, rule-breaking led to generate several alternatives to the “CMOS-based 
pixel” in a rigorous way. To synthesize, experts consider that the design spaces generated by 
the ARD team were actually derived from a “simple” model on “how to get a (Si)-layer for a 
photodiode on the top of the image sensor pixel?”: in the CMOS-based image sensor pixel the 
wafer, i.e. the physical support of the microelectronic components (transistors,…) is used also 
as a photodiode; this is cost-effective but the transistors have to be build beside the 
photodiode, hence reducing the optical surface; and metallization layers are built above the 
photodiode, hence “shielding” the photodiode from light and decreasing its efficiency. There 
is an “optical path” between the top of the sensor and the photodiode that is too long. The 
“ideal” optical path is an optical path reduced to zero and the optical surface should be as 
large as the pixel surface. Experts knowledge leads to identify three main design alternatives: 
the so-called “backside” consists in keeping the existing pixel and turning it upside down, so 
that light enters through the “backside” of the CMOS-based pixel. The optical surface is still 
not ideal but the optical path is null; the “above IC” alternative consists in building a Si-layer 
on the top of transistors; the 3D alternative consists in building transistors on the top of a 
photodiode and turning the whole upside down; “above IC” and 3D are both leading to an 
Desorptive 
capacity 
Analysis of the EAC reference  Analysis in CAC 
Phenomenon (non desorption : in EAC, follow the “DNA” of the family of 
products) 
Break a particularly constraining design rules, offering promising 
alternatives. “Unlearning” 
Prior related 
knowledge 
Prior related knowledge gives the design rules to be applied, defines 
the problem space and gives the probability that a solution will be 
found in that problem space 
Prior related knowledge helps to identify the “most constraining / 
most “promising” design rule, occasionally through specific 
investigations 
Strategy, 
mental models 
and 
organization 
The design rules are coherent with organization, strategy and mental 
models.  
Strategy: desorptive capacity corresponds to a “strategy to change”. 
Rule breaking is seen as a “careful alternative”, as a 
“complementary” alternative.  
Mental models: wish to make mental models evolve 
Organization: based on “organized deviance”. There is a true 
organizational support with a mission to change the game (even if it 
is with limited resources). 
Effect on AC Directly linked to a community that provides relevant knowledge for 
exploring the problem space.  
Cut from classical knowledge providers.  
Sensitive to “out of the box” signals (so called weak signals) 
Effect for 
innovation 
Quick identification of a relevant problem space Capacity to resist fixation effect: avoid to be fixed by the design rule 
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ideal optical surface and ideal optical path. These propositions are not solutions for the ideal 
pixel, they are just “design paths”, generated from a “simple” model of pixel architecture. 
Each path defines a problem space with specific fitness functions, constraints and related 
knowledge domains (for instance the backside pixel path leads to work on “turning upside 
down” which means actually cutting and bonding wafers and leads to contact research labs 
specialized in material handling whereas above IC will focus on how to build a “hot” Si-layer 
on a “fragile” metal layer and leads to research labs and process experts working on “low 
temperature” Si-layer).  
The C-K representation of this phase of the ARD design trajectory is depicted in Figures 6 
and 7. 
 
  
Figure 6 : New design spaces identification and initial knowledge collection  
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Figure 7 : New design spaces initial structuration 
 
We can clearly differentiate this process from the classical EAC in D-teams: after design 
rule acceptance, D-teams identify one main problem space and organize a search process in it. 
Design rules help to frame the problem; they also help to subdivide it into sub problem 
spaces, in a classical WBS (work breakdown structure). For instance the improvement of 175 
generation took the form of a series of rule-based design projects with well-identified targets 
(Grade 1: optimize CMOS metal lyaer thickness for a better optical performance ; grade 2: 
shorten the optical path by reducing the whole CMOS based stack (passivation, planarization, 
metal layers; from 3.3! to 2.3!; grade 3: better focusing the optical waves, avoiding 
refraction, by low T° SiON, made with LMGP and LETI; grade 4-5: decrease cross-talk ; 
grade 6: new resists, new cavity etching, : new resist from suppliers (to decrease OP; grade 7: 
micro lens optimization). AC at each stage favors a wide, efficient exploration of the whole 
problem space: bringing more detailed expertise, AC helps to counterbalance a kind of 
“bounded rationality” that prevents designers to really find the optimum in the problem space. 
 
The “hook building” concept is based on prior related knowledge and constant learning on 
the ideal architectures of pixels (other architecture are regularly studied, including 
architectures based on photosynthesis or other strongly different photo sensor principles). We 
find also in this case that strategy, mental models and organization are determinants of AC 
(there is a clear demand for technological breakthroughs made to the ARD team); but they are 
also determined by hook building: several strategic alternatives emerge, with various strategic 
value (short vs. long term, low vs. high investment, opening new user value or not,…) and the 
variety of alternatives is a protection against fixation effects and path dependency; these 
alternatives give references to the designers in the fields: behind each strange architecture 
they can also recognize technical references used in other fields (cutting and assembling is 
technology already managed by some innovative suppliers, low T processes are also 
investigated in “memory” manufacturing,…). This anchors the alternatives in existing skills, 
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thus facilitating evolutions of the mental models towards “rule-breaking” alternatives. The 
organization is barely changed during this phase: the “hook building” capacity doesn’t require 
changes in the skills structure but it requires to make use of existing resources (relationship 
with research labs, with development,…); but after some months of work new competences 
finally give birth to new skills recognized in the organizational structure.  
It is interesting to underline that hook building didn’t begin with “new skills” and high 
level expertise but rather on broad, generative models that help generate problem spaces and 
links to new types of competences. Generative models led to the creation of an epistemic AC. 
But generative models and the episteme have to be clearly distinguished: the first one helps 
generate “creative” alternatives and is related to the structure of the set of alternatives whereas 
the second one is related to one specific field of expertise characterizing one problem space. 
Our data suggest that “hook building” is based on generative models and then gives birth to 
EAC. Not all problem spaces will give birth to new EAC. But in case of success, some will. 
There is a strong effect of “hook building” on the use of external knowledge: the new 
problem spaces lead the ARD team to pay attention to new knowledge bases (new types of 
conferences, new types of patents, of thesis, of competitors, on suppliers,…): the team 
monitors the environment simultaneously much broader and also more efficiently. We find 
here a “broad range of knowledge domains” but this range is carefully constructed through the 
generative model. We also find that some of the identified alternatives will unfold as far as 
giving birth to a new EAC. In the 2005, the backside alternative was still considered as one 
“rule-breaking” alternative among others, without structured EAC. But the identification of 
the backside problem space led to identify research labs, suppliers and researchers expert on 
cutting and bonding. Some months later, when backside was considered as the most likely 
candidate for the 2008-generation, a D-project was launched and this D-project could use  the 
design rules and the links to external knowledge providers created by the ARD-tream. Our 
data confirm that this was done in the “EAC” mode identified above: clear design rules, 
leading to one design space where the effort is devoted to searching the space and find an 
optimimum thanks to external knowledge.  
We can summarize the differences between the reference case and the intentionally rule-
breaking case in the following way (table 4): 
 
Hook building ST Development (reference) – intentionally rule-based ST Advanced R&D – intentionally rule-breaking 
Phenomenon There is a clear problem space defined by fitness 
function {max “full well”, min “quantum efficiency”} 
under CMOS constraints (ie keep process steps, 
architecture and technological principles, etc.) and by 
local optimization principles. This problem space is 
regularly updated (eg increase the level of the fitness 
function, take new constraints into account,...) 
For optimization, the problem space is sub-divided into 
smaller ones, defined by sub-fitness functions 
(minimize the thickness of one critical layer, optimize 
the architecture of one component,…) and sub-
constraints, each sub-problem space being associated 
to relevant competences.  
One simple model = “even the whole story is quite complex one can consider that 
the main strategic alternatives were generated by the question: how to get a Si-
photodiode in a stack to maximize optical path and optical surface” (ARD project 
leader) It leads to three contrasted spaces with specific fitness functions and 
constraints:  
! Use wafer Si: “backside” (turn upside down!): opt path = 0 but opt surface is 
not full. Short term, limited increase of performance keep architecture and main 
steps; add assembly steps (bonding, grinding) 
! Create Si on the top of the stack: “above IC”. new process for Medium term, 
higher perfo and new functions, () 
! Use wafer Si but change transistor temperature: “3D”: transfer Si (opt path = 
0; surface = max) new architecture, new process; knowledge base renewal, for 
long term perspective. 
The detail process shows that the complete generative models actually use 
existing knowledge on cost models, performance models, process models, 
architecture models.  
Prior related 
knowledge 
knowledge = DR to make a link between the main 
topic and the relevant, available K. Eg: capacity to 
decompose the problem into relevant blocks, such that 
each sub pb can be solved with one specific skills. 
Knowledge on a stabilized netw of partners sharing the 
same fitness function and constraints.  
prior related knowledge is useful as a source of “high level”, generative models. 
Even prior related knowledge from loosely related area like photosynthesis (a 
kind of photodiode!) is useful 
Learning: “high level” models are often incomplete: learn from past experiences 
(past trials on Si-based photodiode); eg: rebuild, refine the generative model in 
particular on eco criteria. 
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Strategy, 
mental 
models and 
organization 
Mental models : stable. Find new optima with known 
principles. 
Strategy: Coherent with competitive environment, 
check the fit with CMOS based strategic treatment. 
Minimize funded collaboration. 
Organization: Subdivide the complex problem space 
into several subprojects. Avoid propagation of any 
change to other process steps. Organization of the link 
to external knowledge suppliers: repeated 
collaborations, known competences because of the 
structure of the academic disciplines  
Strategy: use classical knowledge of strategy (costs, make or buy, resources 
available or not,…) to generate several strategic pathes  
Mental models: rebuild coherent, collective  mm: linked new alternatives to 
existing knowledge bases, reorganize knowledge bases for multiple purposes; 
linked also to perf criteria. Multiple but coordinated  mm, rooted partly in 
existing K 
Organization:  limited input from strategic level (no predefined strategic vision). 
Linked to several external network that help to frame (bring elements of the 
generative models or bring links to external knowledge on each pb space)  
Effect on AC Make use of (relevant, up to date) knowledge available 
in the semiconductor community, as well as in the 
“optic on CMOS” network (specialized R lab, 
suppliers,…).  
Capacity to absorb knowledge in an EAC mode (clear problem space, in line with 
a strategic view point) Actually several “E” for EAC(s)! One proof of it: in the 
n+1 generation, D teams are using AC that was created by ARD in the previous 
run.  
Organize efficient intelligence: monitor external environment by targeting 
specific knowledge domains (ie “broad range” but very carefully constructed 
range) 
Effect on 
innovation 
Better optimization on the problem space (overcome 
“bounded” rationality) 
Create a set of innovation alternatives. Increase reactivity and flexibility : the n+1 
generation could be launched in D because of the knowledge gathered by ARD.  
Table 4 : Hook building – comparative case study 
 
This comparison leads to characterize a second feature of absorptive capacity in situation 
of radical innovation, a “hook building” capacity (see table 5 below) 
1- whereas EAC consists in searching, inside a problem space given by design rules, for 
an optimal solution, by relying on external knowledge to overcome bounded 
rationality, CAC consists in generating several contrasted problem spaces, by using 
simple, controllable generative models, in order to link each problem space to 
existing, external knowledge.  
2- Whereas EAC is based on prior related knowledge to efficiently use design rules 
(adapt to specific problem, subdivision in subproblem spaces,…), CAC use prior 
related knowledge not to solve a problem but as  generative models to open multiple 
problem spaces. These generative models enrich and diffract the vision in several 
visions.  
3- Whereas EAC follows strategic vision, mental models and organization, CAC can 
also influence them. “hook building” consists also in generating new strategic 
visions, in “pluging the new into the old”, ie in linking the rule-breaking project into 
existing domain of knowledge, in supporting the emergence and consolidation of new 
skills that could become the backbone of future organizations (and hence EAC).  
4- Each hook becomes a basis for EAC emergence, defining aspects of fitness functions 
(value), of constraints (validation criteria) and search procedures. 
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Table 5 : Hook building – synthesis 
 
3.2.3. Stimulate new knowledge providers / milieu stimulation capacity 
The generation of problem spaces works fine as long as a generative model “opens” 
problem spaces and there is external knowledge relevant for those problem spaces. In certain 
cases, critical knowledge can be missing: either there is no external knowledge or certain 
problem spaces are not precise enough. Our “rule-breaking” teams show an interesting 
strategy to overcome this obstacle: they produce critical knowledge to stimulate the “external 
milieu”  
We found several examples of this “milieu stimulation capacity”. We will just detail one. 
The ARD-team of ST discovered that certain critical pieces of knowledge on the third 
alternative, 3-D pixel, were not worked by anybody in the milieu. A careful literature review 
confirmed this lack of knowledge while further investigations on customer value confirmed 
the potential of that path. The team decided to produce some additional knowledge to 
stimulate the development of some knowledge in the “3d-pixel” area. But it wasn’t possible to 
find additional internal resources for this research. Actually is was already difficult to just ask 
for some resources because of the lack of knowledge to only justify it. Hence the team had to 
design an experiment without resources. They contacted manufacturing sites to get “free” 
samples (old samples that could be reused for specific aging tests); they also visited external 
research labs to organize free partnerships with ongoing research projects. After some months 
the ARD-leader was able to show a set of experiments to prove the feasibility and 
performance of a 3D-pixel (Coudrain et al. 2008a; Coudrain et al. 2008b). The set of 
experiments show the possibility to transfer a 30nm Si-layer by molecular bonding, to build a 
transistor at low temperature with valuable characteristics and to define the maximal thermal 
budget for critical components of the pixel.  
This experiment required heavy prior related knowledge on two issues: minimize the cost 
of experiment by reusing as much as possible knowledge already externally produced. ARD 
 
Hook building  
Analysis of the EAC reference Analysis in CAC 
Phenomenon frame into a single pb space based on 
existing DR 
refine knowledge base to be closer to 
an optimum (improve the satisfycing 
solution by avoiding “bounded 
rationality” due to limited knowledge 
base). Consequence = each outside 
knowledge is indicated by DR and is 
compatible with DR (keep stable DR) 
rebuild several pb spaces to create links with existing external knowledge (rejuvenate 
EAC). Based on the use of generative models that:  
1- generate several contrasted pb spaces (vs decompose one single pb space) 
2- is simple, open and controllable (vs based on complete design rules) 
3- help to fit with external, contrasted knowledge (fishing !) (vs help to optimize in one 
pb space) 
Prior related 
knowledge 
use strong episteme, possibly with 
updates, to optimize search of the pb 
space (work division, knowledge to be 
more optimal,…) 
Role of prior related knowledge and learning= use some (very generic) knowledge (part 
of mental model, of strategy,…) to enhance the generation of multiple problem spaces.  
Strategy, 
mental models 
and 
organization 
stable mm, coherent with strat, linked 
to firm core competences. 
Go as far as already mapping the network of potential knowledge providers.  
Strategy: use strategic knowledge –generic- to generate strategic visions 
Mental models: rebuild several mental models and illustrate their rigor. Plug the new 
into the old 
Organization: use existing resources + make possible new orga (based on emerging 
EAC). Key role of intermediary actors, either supplying knowledge for generic models 
Paradox: no new skills required but it will support the acquisition of new knowledge 
 
Effect on AC Directly linked to a community that 
provides relevant knowledge for 
exploring the problem space.  
Each “hook” becomes a basis for EAC: the value of knowledge is known, the paths for 
assimilation are identified, useful applications are already prepared.  
Effect for 
innovation 
Better optimization inside a problem 
space 
Create multiple alternatives with associated problem spaces and competences to explore 
these problem spaces.  
Brings better risk management and higher flexibility 
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team had to know the external labs, their instrumentations and research program to quickly 
find resources required for their experiment. Moreover they have to know how to convince 
the research labs: they have to design the convincing experiment that should help them to 
work further on the topic. In the end the demonstration made by the ARD team finally only 
relied on pieces of experiments gathered from several external research labs!  
This “milieu stimulation capacity” is largely constrained by organization, mental models 
and strategic vision. At ST they led to severely limit the resources of the ARD-team as soon 
as the investments were not self-evidently linked to development capacities. But the 
demonstration clearly aimed at evolving mental models and strategy: it focused on the 
production of critical knowledge that would legitimate innovative design pathes and provoke 
a renewal of the strategic debates; it targeted demonstrators that would give the most food for 
though. As the team leader says “after our trial, people begin to think that it is feasible and 
that optimization can now begin”. The demonstrator didn’t validate a solution but it was a 
mobilizing result: “if this works then it becomes worth paying attention to several other 
alternatives”.  
This demonstrator had interesting effect on the capacity to use external knowledge. On the 
one hand it convinced internally that the “3D-pixel” is credible. It showed that it could 
reasonably become a problem space and not only a crazy concept without any hope of 
feasibility. It made ST people aware of the interest and even if it didn’t convince them to 
work internally on the topic, it led them to put the topic (and the external research labs 
working on it) under surveyance. One the other hand, the demonstrator stimulated the launch 
of research programs on the topic of 3D-pixel by external partners (supplier like Soitec, 
public research lab like LETI,…). It stimulated the production of relevant knowledge on this 
area. 
Figure 8 gives the final C-K representation of the ARD team design trajectory, including 
this “milieu stimulation”  
 
 
Figure 8 : C-K representation including ARD team stimulation of for new external knowledge 
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Note that knowledge production is not a characteristic in itself. Even rule-based projects 
relying heavily on external knowledge produce knowledge. At ST we could observe how D-
teams prepared some design of experiments to better focus on the knowledge to be acquired 
inside the problem space; we also observed how D-teams completed this DoE by experiments 
made internally. More specific to rule breaking is that knowledge production is oriented 
towards opening new problem spaces, instead of identifying solutions into an existing one.  
 (see table 6 below).  
 
Milieu 
stimulation 
ST Development (reference) – 
intentionally rule-based 
ST Advanced R&D – intentionally rule-breaking 
Example Knowledge production for updating, 
optimization, modeling, new materials, 
etc. ie Knowledge production INSIDE 
the design rules 
Transfer a 30nm Si-film by molecular bonding (technology demonstration), with 
controlled maximal thermal budget (killer criteria), with “low temperature” 
transistor (killer criteria), with acceptable transistor characteristics (technology 
selection) 
Prior related 
knowledge 
Extend prior related knowledge in 
classic, well-identified directions (be up 
to date on CMOS) 
knowledge on the labs and theirs instruments (know that “thermal budget” has 
already been investigated in a close area; reuse high-k transistors,…). Knowledge 
on how to convince the labs: prove the innocuousness of the material for their 
instruments, prove that the Research question can be relevant for publication…) 
Strategy, 
mental models 
and 
organization 
Classical development: clear project 
target and evaluation criteria, based on 
shared mental models. 
“leverage” external knowledge 
production: ie make people produce 
relevant knowledge  without funding 
them (directly).  
Strategy:  avoid strategic discussion on the opportunity, stay in the given 
organizational framework (the project is a PhD work); but focuses on knowledge 
that enables a renewal of strategic debates.  
Mental models: avoid “religious war” (“believe / not believe”). No direct 
conflict with mental models. Target trials that give the most food for thought 
(“people begin to think that it is feasible and that optimization could now begin”). 
Not a “necessary” conditions” that would be validated (there could be other 
pathes for 3D pixel) but a “mobilizing” result: if that works then it is worth 
paying attention to this concept.  
Organization: use classical organizational framework (research labs, advanced 
R&D, use a PhD work although it does not have the attributes of a classical PhD 
study). But strongly linked transversally to internal knowledge producers 
(manufacturing,…). Not skunk work but smart reuse.  
Effect on AC Access efficiently to externally 
produced, most recent knowledge in the 
episteme 
Support the otherwise unreachable problem space by:  
1- convincing internally that one specific design space is credible. Show that it 
becomes a legitimate problem space and not only utopia. Make ST people able 
to recognize the value of externally produced knowledge (but does NOT 
necessarily convince them to work themselves on this topic) 
2- fertilize the ecosystem: stimulate the launch of research program on the topic 
of image sensor 3D by partners (SOITEC, LETI). Indirectly reinforces related 
programs at Stanford and Samsung (more based on SRAM 3D). Make the 
ecosystem produces relevant knowledge in this area.  
 
Table 6 : milieu stimulation in the comparative case studies 
 
This comparison leads to characterize a third feature of absorptive capacity in situation of 
radical innovation, a “milieu stimulation” capacity (see table 7 below): 
1- whereas EAC can consist in completing or targeting knowledge provided by 
external sources, CAC consists in producing knowledge that open/confirm the 
possibility of a problem space. It tends to discover, legitimate, or strengthen a 
problem space (and not to search it).  
2- Even if this capacity address the issue of missing knowledge, it requires a strong 
“prior related knowledge”: it is necessary to identify the “hole”, to know the 
knwoledge production capacities (types of instruments, partners,…), to identify 
the value of the potential results for the whole milieu. There is often a long 
reasoning before identifying the relevant experiment.  
3- The “milieu stimulation capacity” tends to avoid premature debates that would be 
based on “old” strategic visions and mental models, by minimizing the “visibility” 
of the experiment (minimizing first the budget: the experiments were often led 
without budget!). This is all the more so surprising that the same organizations 
had often supported the two first movements (desorption and hook building). 
Investigating this issue, it appears that the “minimization” is justified by avoiding 
a”decision” effect: debates on the budget or simply budgeting the demonstrator 
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would cause irreversibility. By avoiding a too-early debate on the budget, the rule-
breaking team avoid both irreversibility favoring one path or too early “no go” 
decision. Minimizing early debates, the “milieu stimulation capacity” tries to 
maximize ex-post debates by providing knowledge for strategic debates and 
mental models changes.  
4- The “milieu stimulation capacity” enable new problem spaces first by supporting 
the emergence of new knowledge providers in the ecosystem; second it makes 
company’s people receptive to knowledge produced in the area, hence reinforcing 
their capacity to recognized the value of externally produced knowledge.  
 
 
Table 7 : Milieu stimulation - synthesis  
Desorptive 
capacity 
Analysis of the EAC 
reference 
Analysis in CAC 
Phenomenon Necessary to produce or 
make produce knowledge to 
prepare for the evolution of 
the episteme 
Orient knowledge production towards:  
- relevant question, ie questions that open/confirm the possibility of a pb space (for legitimacy, for 
discovering new pb spaces, for strengthening the pb space (new ext knowledge provider) 
- Not available, not expected knowledge 
- Can be addressed at low cost (either internally or by well-identified R labs).  
Target critical topics that open strong alternatives. Not a “feasibility test”,  not a validation, not a 
“necessary condition” 
Prior related 
knowledge 
Prior related knowledge is 
useful to orient knowledge 
production on the evolution 
of the episteme 
 Prior related knowledge and learning are very important, even if it addresses missing knowledge! 
Know the potential value, know the hole (and a hole not solved in the “laissez-faire” trajectory), know 
the knowledge production capacity (types of instruments, of partners,…) ie long reasoning to design 
relevant experiment 
Strategy, 
mental models 
and 
organization 
Coherent with the mental 
models, organization and 
strategy.  
An “investment” small enough to avoid explanations (!); rather a kind of “slack” (be very light, to 
avoid strategic discussion) with very high impact (change mental models and strategy regarding 
certain problem spaces).  
Effect on AC Enhance the capacity to 
integrate evolutions of the 
rules (in a deterministic 
trajectory) 
Structure / enable new pb spaces, hence new potential knowledge providers. Change the ecosystem, 
make external knowledge providers prepare knowledge for that particular problem space 
(create knowledge providers!) 
Demonstration of the viability/ the promise of certain pathes. Make (internal) people be able to 
recognize the value of externally produced knowledge 
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PART 4. A MODEL OF AC FOR INNOVATION: COMBINING CAC AND EAC TO 
GET RULE BREAKING AND RULE BASED INNOVATION.  
 
In prior sections we sketched the facets of the capacity to use external knowledge in case 
of radical innovation that emerged from our data. These facets suggest three propositions 
which meet our three initial research directions:  
P1: teams that show “desorptive capacity” (break constraining design rules) are more 
likely to be sensitive to weak signals, to avoid fixation effect and hence to explore out-of-the-
box innovations areas.  
P2: teams that show “hook building capacity” (usage and limited extension of existing 
knowledge bases to define generative models enabling them to identify and frame innovation 
paths) are more likely to frame breakthrough conceptual visions into actionable problem 
spaces, to link the unknown into the known, to avoid cognitive crisis and isolation. Hence they 
are more likely to create epistemic AC in relation with existing knowledge areas 
P3: teams that show “milieu stimulation capacity” (structure new, original problem 
spaces and stimulate the creation of knowledge by external resources) are more likely, in the 
future, to dispose of external knowledge and to be able to recognize them. Hence they are 
more likely to have epistemic AC on emerging field in the future.  
 
More broadly our findings offer a holistic view (ie relatively complete and integrated) of 
how teams in charge of radical innovation make use of external knowledge: the teams break 
one (or several) design rules, they reestablish links with existing resources and occasionally 
create original alternatives by completing existing external knowledge base and stimulating 
the development of new problem spaces; by doing this they support “out-of-the-box” thinking 
(ie divergence), based on generative models or newly created knowledge, and support, enrich 
and legitimize the new concept through existing knowledge and new knowledge created by 
the milieu. The three capacities taken together 1) favor radical innovation and 2) enable the 
use of external knowledge despite and in favor of this radical innovation. We have here found 
specific facets of absorptive capacity that support a positive relationship between AC and 
radical innovation.  
These three facets share in common a specific lever on external knowledge: in epistemic 
AC, external knowledge is triggered by design rules that link a priori the design issue to a 
problem space with well-identified fitness function (representation of the value), constraints 
(representation of the design parameters of the solution) and even search strategies; in our 
case, design rules are intentionally broken and cannot organize the link between the 
innovation challenge (or what we can call a concept, a vision) and external knowledge; this 
relation is structured by refinements of the conceptual vision: the “desorptive capacity” adds 
negations (not with the design rule xxx) to the concept; the “hook building” adds generative 
models to the concept; the “milieu stimulation” adds newly created, milieu convincing pieces 
of knowledge to the concept. These refined visions are not design rules; they still are 
concepts. And we have shown that they trigger external knowledge. We hence have here an 
absorptive capacity that is NOT based on design rules but based on concept refinements. 
That’s why we call it “conceptual AC” (or vision-based, vision driven AC).  
 
Further our analysis points to the key insight that CAC is based on prior related 
knowledge; we find here a similar trait with EAC. But in EAC prior related knowledge is 
actually assimilated to the knowledge of the design rules and its applications. In CAC, prior 
related knowledge plays a much wider role: in desorptive mode, prior related knowledge is 
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the knowledge of the consequences, limits and constraints of using design rules; in hook 
building mode, prior related knowledge is used to build generative models to generate 
multiple problem spaces, i.e. knowledge is used as a way to enhance, diffract and diverge the 
initial concept (vision), it is used to create multiple problem spaces not to frame a problem 
into one predefined problem space; in “milieu stimulation” mode, prior related knowledge is 
used to identify the holes in the known, this is a prior related knowledge of the unknown, this 
is also prior related knowledge on what could convince external actors to produce knowledge 
in a specific, often strange, direction. Generally speaking prior related knowledge is used to 
build an enriched vision that is then used to search for external knowledge, this is not used as 
a constraining bridge between the initial problem and the space of solutions. This brings our 
proposition P4: in CAC, prior related knowledge is a strong determinant of CAC (as in EAC) 
and prior related knowledge is used as a resource to enrich the concept.  
In our case study we also analyzed the relationship between CAC and so-called “internal” 
determinants of AC, namely: strategy, organization and mental models in the organization. 
We confirmed that these determinants played a powerful role on EAC in rule-based projects; 
we also analyze that they are determinants of CAC. But we have also analyzed that CAC also 
reacts on strategy, mental models and organizations. In “desorptive” mode, CAC enables the 
existence of rule-breaking alternatives complementing the mainstream rule-based strategy. 
This is justified as a risk management. In “hook building”, CAC links the provocative 
propositions of rule-breaking concepts to existing knowledge and resources, hence CAC 
favors new strategic alternative and enriched strategic visions. It supports the evolution of  
mental models as well as the emergence of new skills in the organization. In “milieu 
stimulation” mode, CAC legitimates internally as well as externally the creations of original 
path. This leads to proposition P5: in CAC, there is feedback loop from AC to its classical 
determinants (that hence become depending variables) so that CAC can support changes in 
strategy, mental models and organization.  
 
Finally our emerging theoretical model of CAC suggests that CAC and EAC are 
complementary. In situation of rule-based design, one can easily figure out that CAC logic 
would be deeply contradictory (breaking design rules whereas the project aims at working 
with them); but conversely, in situation of rule-breaking, CAC and EAC are not contradictory 
but complementary: CAC prepares the ground for the emergence of EAC. As we have seen in 
our case, after first works with CAC, the following generation of products (backside imagers) 
is actually based on EAC, where EAC design rules are created by CAC. The ARD team using 
CAC in 2005 and 2006 has prepared the design rules used for designing “backside” in 2009 at 
ST. Hence we see that CAC actually tends to regenerate design rules and related EAC. This is 
reinforced by the fact that CAC not only proposed candidate design rules but enable to work 
on all the aspects of a design rule: CAC enables to shape (at least marginally) strategy, 
organization and mental model so that they become compatible and adapted with the new 
design rules.  
We can formulate proposition P6: in rule breaking situations CAC and EAC are 
complementary, CAC regenerates EAC.  
 
These propositions can be summarized by the figure below (see figure 4 below) 
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Figure 3: synthesis of the propositions on CAC and EAC !
 
 
 
 
PART 5.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
A key issue is whether post hoc “sense making” influences our findings. As noted earlier, 
we reduced this possibility by triangulating archives and interviews inside and outside the 
firm i.e. using a data collection approach that reduces informant bias (Santos and Eisenhardt 
2009). In fact, only a few informants could describe the “big picture” of what had occurred at 
the innovation issue they were working on. Thus, it seems unlikely that informants with 
different information, focused on different design reasoning at varied times, and at very 
different innovation topics with diverse starting positions, would have exhibited similar 
retrospective sense making. Finally, our findings do not require hyper rationality among the 
designers. Although they shared the central challenge of succeeding in innovation situation 
(be it radical or rule-based), our designers often approached this challenge by taking actions 
as events unfolded and learning from mistakes. Thus, our designers plausibly described a 
blend of emergent and deliberate actions, together with mistakes and serendipitous learning 
that occurred while they were trying to succeed in innovation situation. 
A clear limit of our study, however, is the restriction to one case study. The final proposals 
are therefore valid only in the specific context we analyzed. Multiple cases are generally 
regarded as being more robust than single case studies because comparisons across cases 
provide greater validity in the development of insights and fuller consideration of the context 
dependency of the case project (McDermott and O'Connor 2002; Yin 2003; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007). Further research will be needed to validate our model against additional 
cases.  
 
 33 
We add to the study of absorptive capacity in situation of radical innovation. Our core 
theoretical contribution is a holistic framework of a new type of absorptive capacity, called 
conceptual absorptive capacity, by which designers make use of external knowledge to 
succeed in radical innovation. CAC is composed of three different ways of making use of 
external knowledge to succeed in radical innovation : a « desorptive capacity » that helps to 
avoid the trap of reusing existing design rules, ie avoid fixation effect, a “hook building 
capacity” that avoids the cognitive crisis and isolation and help to build cognitive references 
(link the unknown to the known), and a “milieu stimulation capacity” that contributes to avoid 
to limit exploration to existing knowledge and support the emergence of new competences in 
the milieu. Collectively, these capacities explicate how designers in radical innovation 
situations are still using external knowledge while changing design rules, while finding or 
even creating new cognitive references.  
A more fundamental contribution is the reinvigoration of the notion of AC as a rich notion 
to model the relationship between knowledge and innovation, in particular in case of radical 
innovation. The relationship between knowledge and innovation is falsely simple and self-
evident. Actually it knew two contrasted aspects: on the one, it took decades to clarify the fact 
that the innovation process cannot be reduced to research (basic research, advanced 
research,…) in a “techno push” mode. The most seducing myths of basic R&D making 
innovation, like Du Pont Nylon, have been studied to clarify the (limited) role of research in 
innovation (Hounshell and Smith 1988). Whereas it is now clear that knowledge is not 
enough to innovate, the pendulum is going far on the other direction: in an “open innovation” 
economy, knowledge is always available, creativity becomes the key variable and knowledge 
could even become a core rigidity, the cause of a fixation effect that impedes creativity. 
 Between these two extremes, Cohen and Levinthal AC appeared as a fruitful way to 
explain that there is neither direct deterministic link between knowledge and radical 
innovation but that knowledge is still indispensible for innovation: it is possible to innovate 
by sourcing some expertise externally, but it is impossible to use this external knowledge 
without some “prior related knowledge” (Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Cohen and Levinthal 
1990; Cohen and Levinthal 1994). Nevertheless the detailed model has been developed for a 
specific type of innovation: problem solving, rule-based innovation. For this kind of situation, 
the authors modeled AC as a “filter”: when the problem is well-defined, this filter helps to 
search and select relevant pieces of knowledge in the environment. AC helps to find an 
optimal solution in a predefined problem space. In radical innovation, this model leads to 
paradoxical conclusions regarding AC as a link between knowledge and innovation: radical 
innovation is very likely to require a lot of external knowledge and hence requires absorptive 
capacity; but radical innovation also requires to break design rules (to think out of the box) 
hence requires to destroy AC.  
Our study confirms the model of AC in non-radical innovation situations, i.e. “rule-based” 
innovation: in this case, we confirm that AC is actually an “epistemic AC”, i.e. is based on 
design rules. Moreover our study contributes to overcome the paradox of AC in radical 
innovation: our study suggests to avoid to limit AC to prior related knowledge; AC is actually 
both knowledge and creativity; in non radical innovation, only the knowledge side appears; in 
radical innovation, both sides are present and work together is a complex way; instead of 
being a filter, AC is a capacity to learn to enrich the concept, to “work” the concept creatively 
by maintaining a powerful, mobile link to external knowledge with contrasted aspects: avoid 
to be fixed, insert creative unknown concepts, stimulate knowledge production. By 
introducing the notion of “conceptual capacity” we underline the “imagery” aspect of AC. 
The innovation issue is worked in this way, the initial “innovative issue” is gradually refined 
and ramified, and the knowledge environment is enlarged; the works goes on unless the 
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concept is transformed into a “problem”, ie a problem space is identified with its related 
design rules.  
Introducing CAC helps then to better understand AC as a dynamic capability (Teece and 
Pisano 1994; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Lane, Koka and Pathak 2006; Lichtenthaler and 
Lichtenthaler 2009a): in the EAC model, the feedback loop of AC on determinants like 
organizations, mental models and strategy occurs through realized innovation and knowledge. 
This led initially the authors to analyze feedback loop as path dependencies. In radical 
innovation situations where teams precisely try to create new paths (Geels 2004), CAC 
appears as a more reactive dynamic and smart way to evolve the determinants: each facet of 
CAC is a capability to evolve dynamically strategy, mental models and organizations.  
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